Problem of Evil

I. The Problem of Evil Defined Three terms, "the problem of evil," "theodicy," and "defense" are important to our discussion. The first two are often used as synonyms, but strictly speaking the problem of evil is the larger issue of which theodicy is a subset because one can have a secular problem of evil. Evil is understood as a problem when we seek to explain why it exists (Unde malum?) and what its relationship is to the world as a whole. Indeed, something might be considered evil when it calls into question our basic trust in the order and structure of our world. Peter Berger in particular has argued that explanations of evil are necessary for social structures to stay themselves against chaotic forces. It follows, then, that such an explanation has an impact on the whole person. As David Blumenthal observes, a good theodicy is one that has three characteristics: "[I]t should leave one with one’s sense of reality intact." (It tells the truth about reality.) "[I]t should leave one empowered within the intellectual-moral system in which one lives." (Namely, it should not deny God’s basic power or goodness.) "[I]t should be as intellectually coherent as possible." (It is an answer that is both coherent and life-satisfying.) This is not to suggest that every culture deals with evil in the same way. As Amélie Rorty notes, evil and its relationship to the world has been understood in the West in a number of ways, including the following: The Neo-platonic: Evil as the privation or negation of the good or being, so that evil is only evil set against the greater good. Theodicy and coherentism: Evil can be understood as part of or in relationship to God’s larger plans for the cosmos. Manichaeanism: Good and evil are equal conflicting powers expressing their opposition in human history. Pious rationalism: Human reason cannot understand evil, but reason must postulate a God to explain human morality. Pious fidiesm: Human reason cannot understand evil, so a leap of faith is required to trust in God. Pessimism: Evil is real, but the world does not make sense nor can it be understood. Non-existent: Evil does not actually exist; rather, human beings project their own subjective disapproval onto events and actions. II. Theodicy Defined "Theodicy" is a term that Leibniz coined from the Greek words theos (God) and dike (righteous). A theodicy is an attempt to justify or defend God in the face of evil by answering the following problem, which in its most basic form involves these assumptions: God is all good and all powerful (and, therefore, all knowing). The universe/creation was made by God and/or exists in a contingent relationship to God. Evil exists in the world. Why? Notice what this problem suggests. It begins with the assumption that such a being as God will want to eliminate evil. If God is all good but not all powerful or knowing, then perhaps he doesn’t have the ability to intervene on every occasion. Likewise, if God is all powerful and knowing but not all good, then perhaps he has a mean streak. If God is somehow all these things, but the universe does not exist in a contingent relationship, then God has little to do with evil (even though God’s design can still be faulted). However, if God is both good and powerful, then why does evil exist? Now, this problem assumes several things. The first point implies that God is a personal being, though not all theodicists would agree. Likewise, the second point assumes that God interacts, or at least has interacted at some point, with the world. And that we can recognize evil is in the world assumes that "evil" is something that can be rendered intelligible and, therefore, discussed. Evil is typically defined as any undesired state of affairs and is generally considered to include both moral evil, acts done by humans, and natural evil, which includes pain and suffering that results from natural disasters, diseases, or genetic defects. As one can see this is an issue within and surrounding monotheism. Evil, its origin and purpose, takes on a different meaning when seen from the perspective of a polytheistic, atheistic, or non-theistic belief system. A system in which there are multiple divine powers, no power, or some form of impersonal cosmic force (e.g Tao) will not conceive of the problem in this way. Evil can not only be conceived in metaphysical and religious terms as abomination, disobedience, malevolence, impurity, and dishonor (or alternately in some Eastern systems as illusion or imbalance), it can also be understood in essentially natural or secular terms as social vice, egoism, partiality, corruption, criminality, and sociopathology (cf. Rorty). And many of these while not antithetical to a theistic belief system are not dependent upon one either.Theodicy is a specific branch of theology and philosophy, which attempts to solve The Problem of Evil—the problem that arises when trying to reconcile the observed existence of evil in the world with the assumption of the existence of a God who is fully good (or benevolent) and who is also all-powerful (omnipotent). A "theodicy" also refers to any attempted solution to this conundrum. Almost all traditional theodicies have attempted to logically solve the contradiction amongst the three points—the omnipotence of God, the goodness of God, and the real existence of evil—by negating or qualifying one or another of them. Hence, traditional theodicies are of three types: Denying or qualifying the omnipotence of God (finitism) Denying or qualifying the goodness of God (despotism) Denying the reality of evil Three major traditional theodicies The three major types of traditional theodicies are: 1) Finitism, which denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God in the context of dualism; 2) despotism, which denies or qualifies the goodness of God, because of its belief that God's absolute sovereignty lets him do evil things in the eyes of humans; and 3) a third kind, denying or qualifying the reality of evil. Finitism: God is not omnipotent Finitism denies or qualifies the omnipotence of God and says that the finite God cannot avoid evil. It takes various forms of dualism. Some religions, such as Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism presented the cosmic dualism of God and Satan. Plato and Aristotle were of the metaphysical dualism of God (or Demiurge) and prime matter (or Receptacle), where God is finite because he must have recourse to prime matter for the constitution of the world. Nikolai Berdyaev and Alfred North Whitehead suggested the mystical dualism of God and Uncreated Freedom (or Creativity), where God is finite because of the pre-existent principle of Uncreated Freedom. The American Methodist philosopher Edgar Brightman suggested a unique kind of finitism with his internal dualism of form and matter within God, where his power is restrained because of form. Finitism sometimes entails the so-called "free will defense" of God (as in Berdyaev and Whitehead) because it gives free will to humans in the context of God's finitude. But this free will defense based on finitism is not the same as the more insightful free will defense proposed by the American philosopher Alvin Plantinga to be treated below. Despotism: God is not fully good This type of theodicy can be seen in staunch Calvinism, and it presupposes the absolute sovereignty of God. God is so sovereign that although he may be a good God in principle, he does not look fully good in actuality. For God is the active creator and instigator of all sin and evil, including the fall, using these as instruments to accomplish his plan. Satan, thus, is considered to have no power of his own but is merely God's puppet. An important part of staunch Calvinism is the belief in the absolute predestination of all things by God, that is, that nothing happens unless God actively makes something happen. Whatever is is right, as long as God wills it. So, there can be no such thing as a problem of evil. In this view, humans have no free will. But, they will still be held responsible for whatever sins they commit because God has decided to judge them by his laws. Besides this Calvinist despotism, so-called "maltheism," the view that God is evil, also solves the problem of evil by attributing evil to God. But, maltheism is quite different from Calvinism because it says that God is simply evil himself without being necessarily despotic. Evil is not real Evil as "non-being" The non-being theme of evil started from St. Augustine, who as a Neoplatonic Christian regarded all being as good, thus referring to evil as non-being. Critiquing the Manichean dualism, which he used to adhere to, he asserted that the universe, including matter and its unique creator, God, are unambiguously good. Evil, therefore, is non-being (non esse). It is the privation, corruption, or perversion of something that was previously or otherwise good. Evil has no substantial being in itself, but is always parasitic upon good. Evil entered the universe through the culpable free actions of otherwise good beings—angels and humans. Sin consisted not in choosing evil (because there was no evil to choose) but in turning away from the higher good of God to a lower good. Natural evils were held by Augustine to be consequences of the fall too, and thus also consequences of human or angelic free will. When one asks what caused man to fall, Augustine answers through his doctrine of "deficient" causation. In his view, there is no positive cause of evil will, but rather a negation of deficiency. Augustine seems to mean by this that free volitions are, in principle, inexplicable—free willing is itself an originating cause, with no prior cause or explanation. This Augustinian definition of evil as the privation of good (privatio boni) can be seen also in St. Thomas Aquinas. It constitutes much of the Christian tradition on the subject of evil. There are other ways of saying that evil is non-existent. According to Spinoza's pantheism, there is no evil in the world which is divine. Mary Baker Eddy, founder of Christian Science, regarded evil simply as illusion, echoing Hinduism and Buddhism. Using relational logic and not theology, Canadian Baha’i mathematician William Hatcher has argued that evil is not absolute but simply "less good" than good.